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Abstract
Estimates of Tobin’s Q for the United States using publicly available
data present an apparent puzzle: it is systematically less than unity. This
paper sets out a simple model consistent with rational stock market valu-
ation under conditions of asymmetric information that provides a possible
explanation of this puzzle
JEL Classifications: C32, C53, E44, G10, G14.
Estimates of Tobin’s Q for the United States using publicly available data
present an apparent puzzle. It is usually assumed that the ratio of the stock
market’s valuation of US corporations to their underlying recorded assets at re-
placement cost should be close to unity, at least on average. Indeed, if there are
significant monopoly rents, or if (as has been claimed by a number of authors in
recent years - eg, Hall, 2000; Laitner & Stolyarov, 2003) statisticians typically
under-record intangible assets, then it would be expected that Tobin’s Q would
typically be above unity. In fact the data show that it has typically been well
below unity.
One possible response to this apparent puzzle is to conclude that the data
must be wrong. This would require that statisticians habitually overestimated
the replacement cost of capital for most of period over which Q can be calculated,
but (at least according to the authors cited above) switched to underestimating it
in the immediate past. Understandably, statisticians, who spend a lot more time
and effort on data construction than economists do, would dispute both these
claims. It therefore seems worth pursuing the possibility that the statisticians,
rather than the economists, are getting it right.
There may indeed be an alternative explanation. Since Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) it has been established that a perfectly efficient stock market, in which
price always equals underlying value, must be a logical impossibility, due to the
costs of information gathering. This paper explores the link between rational
stock market valuations and the corporate sector’s underlying aggregate value, in
the presence of asymmetric information. It asks whether systematic differences
between price and underlying value are a possible alternative explanation of the
properties of recorded q.
1. The Puzzle of Tobin’s Q
Table 1, using data from Wright (2004,2005) shows that mean values of Tobin’s
Q, constructed from a range of publicly available data, have been well below unity
in the postwar era both for the US business sector as a whole,1 and for the better
documented non-farm non-financial corporate sector. The same feature holds in
data for the nonfinancial corporate sector over the course of the entire twentieth
1Note that Laitner & Stolyarov (op cit) derive Tobin’s Q estimates for the business sector
that have an average value greater than unity in the period 1953-2000, and use this as supporting
evidence for claims that there are significant quantities of intangible assets. Wright (2005) shows
however that this feature of their data is due to major errors in data construction.
2
century; and for quoted companies (defining Q on an equity basis) on data since
1871.
Table 1. Alternative Estimates of Tobin’s Q
Geometric Averages
1953-2000 1900-2002 1871-2002
All business 0.859∗ n/a n/a
Nonfarm, Nonfinancial Corporations 0.670∗ 0.648∗∗ n/a
S&P 500 Companies2 0.590-0.695∗∗ 0.525-0.707∗∗ 0.545-0.862∗∗
Sources: ∗ Wright (2004); ∗∗Wright (2005)
2. Stock Market Valuation with Asymmetric Information
2.1. Firms
Consider the value maximisation problem of a representative unleveraged firm.
Our analysis is standard, and closely related to that of Hayashi (1982); Abel and
Blanchard (1986) and many others. Let Ωt represent information available to the
firm at the end of period t. Assume the firm maximises the value of the firm:
Vt = Et [Θt+1 (Dt+1 + Vt+1) |Ωt] (2.1)
where Dt is the total net cashflow to equity holders.3 The firm makes investment
decisions, and chooses factors of production, to maximise its current value, and
simultaneously prices its resulting maximised value with reference to Θt+1, the
one-period ahead stochastic discount factor. Because the firm’s information set is
greater than the public information set, due to the costs of information-gathering,
the firm is in a unique position to assess its own underlying value. It does so,
however, using a market-based measure of (stochastic) opportunity cost.
2.2. Stock Markets
Assume that stock markets price the same income flow, using the same stochastic
discount factor, but on the basis of public information, St:
Pt = Et [Θt+1 (Dt+1 + Pt+1) |St] (2.2)
2Ratio of stock price to net worth per share, derived by cumulating retentions. Estimates
require starting values for Q: range shown based on initial values of 0.5 and 2 in 1871. For
further details of calculations see Wright (2004).
3(For referees: See Endnote A)
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where Pt = stock market value. Rearranging (2.1) and (2.2), we have the no
arbitrage pricing condition
Et [Θt+1 (1 + It+1) |Ωt] = Et [Θt+1 (1 +Rt+1) |St] = 1 (2.3)
where It+1 =
Dt+1+∆Vt+1
Vt
is the internal return, and Rt+1 =
Dt+1+∆Pt+1
Pt
is the stock
return. With symmetric information, this condition would be automatically sat-
isfied by the equality of Pt with Vt for all t and hence of the stock return with the
firm’s internal return. More generally, however, with costly information (which
here can be viewed as providing the rationale for the existence of firms), the infor-
mation sets, and hence the two returns must differ. Since the underlying income
flow being valued is identical, this must in turn imply that Pt must differ from
Vt.4 The pricing condition will nonetheless provide a crucial link between the stock
market’s valuation and underlying value.
2.3. Tobin’s q and “Noise”
For simplicity we assume constant returns to scale and no investment adjustment
costs,5 and hence that firms’ investment ensures aggregate Vt is always equal to
the replacement cost of capital, which we shall assume that statisticians measure
perfectly in aggregate. These are very strong assumptions, but we make them
solely for the sake of isolating the potential role of asymmetric information. There
is no necessary conflict between these assumptions and that of asymmetric infor-
mation, so long as market participants cannot infer value at the individual firm
level from the aggregate.6 Tobin’s Q will then be given by
Qt =
Pt
Vt
(2.4)
In contrast to the usual interpretation of Q, as reflecting investment adjust-
ment costs, in this framework it simply captures the deviation of market prices
from their underlying value if there were symmetric information. We are inter-
ested in whether in this restrictive framework Q may differ systematically from
unity.
4While this feature is a logical implication of rational pricing under asymmetric information
it may of course also arise under other conditions.
5(For referees: See Endnote B)
6(For referees: see Endnote C)
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We first make the pricing condition in (2.3) more transparent by log-linearising.
Letting rt = ln(1 + Rt), qt = lnQt, etc, we can use the Campbell-Shiller (1988)
approximation to write
rt+1 ' ϕ+∆pt+1 + (1− ρ)(dt+1 − pt+1) (2.5)
where ρ = 1
1+exp(d−p) ; ϕ = ln
¡
1 + exp(d− p)
¢
−(1−ρ)(d− p) and d− p = E(d−p).
For values of q sufficiently close to zero, we can apply the same log-linearisation
coefficients to it = ln (1 + It) (replacing p with v) and relate the two log returns
by writing:
rt+1 ' it+1 + εt+1 (2.6)
where, using (2.4) and (2.5)
εt+1 = ρqt+1 − qt (2.7)
Following standard practice, we refer to εt+1 as “noise” even though in our frame-
work we assume it does not arise from any irrationality.
Assuming log normality, taking unconditional expectations of the pricing con-
dition (2.3), using (2.6) and ruling out a deterministic trend in q implies
q ' 1
1− ρE
∙
covt(εt+1, θt+1) + covt(εt+1, it+1) +
vart(εt+1)
2
¸
(2.8)
Covariances and variances may in principle be time-varying. But, so long as
they are themselves stationary, qt will also be stationary (hence pt and vt must be
cointegrated). This general result (which places no other restriction on the process
for qt than that it be stationary) arises simply from the minimal assumption that
the market and the representative firm use the same stochastic discount factor.7
3. Can “Noise” Explain Apparent Under-Pricing?
From (2.8) it is evident that q may in principle be less than zero. This then offers
at least a possible explanation for the observed less-than-unit geometric mean
of Tobin’s Q. A relatively simple calibration exercise, exploiting some further
identifying assumptions, can be used to assess its plausibility.
To simplify, we assume, first that conditional covariances are time-invariant;8
and second that covt(ε, i) = 0. The second assumption is a stronger one, but is
7(For referees: see Endnote D)
8This is an innocuous assumption as long as they are themselves stationary.
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consistent with efficient information-gathering by market participants.9 We can
then re-write (2.8) as:
q ' vart(εt+1)
1− ρ
∙
βθε +
1
2
¸
(3.1)
where βθε = covt(θt+1, εt+1)/vart (εt+1) is the response of the stochastic discount
factor to a unit innovation in εt+1. Since εt+1 will by assumption be observationally
indistinguishable from it+1 using the market information set, St+1 we can on a
priori grounds set βθε = βθi = βθr. This latter coefficient can be treated as known
in our framework, since, using standard assumptions10 the log of the mean equity
premium must equal, with opposite sign, the mean covariance of the stock return
with the unobservable stochastic discount factor. That is, if Rst+1 is the safe return,
and we define
η ≡ logE
µ
1 +Rt+1
1 +Rst+1
¶
= −covt(θt+1, rt+1) = βθrvart (rt+1) (3.2)
then, given that we can observe both η and vart (rt+1) , and hence βθr, the only
unknown element in (3.1) is the conditional variance of εt+1. So we can can infer
the required degree of volatility of “noise” if this is to be the sole explanatory
factor of the observed negative mean of q.
It turns out that, given available emprical estimates, the above expression
simplifies yet further. A mid-range estimate of η (see, eg, Campbell et al, op
cit) is of the order of 0.04. Conveniently, this is also a reasonable estimate of
both var(rt+1)11 and the linearisation parameter 1− ρ, so the expression in (3.1)
simplifies further to
q ' −1
2
vart(εt+1)
vart(rt+1)
The figures for Tobin’s Q for the nonfinancial corporate sector shown in Table 1
imply q ' −1
3
. Thus if we assumed that “noise” was the sole explanatory factor,
we would need the conditional variance of the noise process to be around two
thirds of the conditional variance of the log stock return.
9(For referees: see Endnote E)
10For a standard treatment,see eg, Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay, 1997, Ch 8.
11(For referees: See Endnote F)
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4. Conclusions
This paper has set out a simple model consistent with rational stock market valua-
tion under asymmetric information that appears to provide a possible explanation
for the empirical puzzle that Tobin’s Q is systematically less than unity. The in-
tuition for this result is that, viewed as an investment asset, corporate capital
is relatively safe compared to the stocks and shares that provide notional title
to that capital. It is relatively safe because it is relatively uncorrelated with the
stochastic discount factor, for the simple reason that its return is only imperfectly
observable.
We make no claim that this is actually the sole explanation of Tobin’s Q being
predominantly below unity. Indeed, if it were, this would require “noise” to be the
dominant element in the variability of aggregate stock returns. But our analysis
does suggest that the empirical implications of less than perfect market efficiency
for aggregate stock market valuations are potentially significant.
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Workings
Derivation of (2.6) and (2.7)
If we apply the same linearisation as in (2.5) to the log internal return (which
is acceptable as long as q ' 0→ d− v ' d− p)
it+1 ≡ ln (1 + It+1) ' ϕ+∆vt+1 + (1− ρ)(dt+1 − vt+1) (4.1)
and subtract from (2.5) we have, using (2.4) and (2.7)
rt+1 − it+1 ' ∆pt+1 −∆vt+1 + (1− ρ) [dt+1 − pt+1 − (dt+1 − vt+1)]
' ∆qt+1 − (1− ρ)qt+1
' ρqt+1 − qt
' εt+1
Derivation of (2.8)
Substituting from (2.6) into (2.3), and using θt = logΘt gives
Et exp(θt+1 + it+1)|Ωt = Et exp(θt+1 + it+1 + εt+1)|St
taking logs, exploiting lognormality, and letting σ2x = vart(xt+1); σxy = covt(xt+1, yt+1),
Et
∙
(θt+1 + it+1) +
1
2
¡
σ2θ + σ
2
i + 2σiθ
¢¸ |Ωt
= Et
∙
(θt+1 + it+1 + εt+1) +
1
2
¡
σ2θ + σ
2
i + σ
2
ε + 2σiθ + 2σεθ + 2σεi
¢¸ |St
If we apply the law of iterated expectations repeatedly to derive unconditional
expectations, and assume homoscedasticity, the differences in information sets
disappear, and we get
E
∙
(θt+1 + it+1) +
1
2
¡
σ2θ + σ
2
i + 2σiθ
¢¸
= E
∙
(θt+1 + it+1 + εt+1) +
1
2
¡
σ2θ + σ
2
i + σ
2
ε + 2σiθ + 2σεθ + 2σεi
¢¸
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which allows us to cancel terms,
0 = E (εt+1) +E
∙
σ2ε
2
+ σεθ + σεi
¸
Hence, using (2.7),
−E (εt+1) ' −∆q + (1− ρ)q ' E
∙
σ2ε
2
+ σεθ + σεi
¸
ruling out a deterministic trend in q implies ∆q = 0, hence we can solve to give
(2.8).
Derivation of (3.1)
To get (3.1) we set σεi = 0 and apply the homoscedasticity assumption (which,
it should be noted, simply implies that conditional variances and covariances are
constant over time - it does not imply that they equal their unconditional values).
Endnotes for Referees
A.We could equivalently consider the problem of a leveraged firm in a Miller-
Modigliani setting, where leverage does not affect firm value. In this caseDt would
be the net cashflow to equity and bondholders. This would be more consistent
with the data on q, which include the market value of debt in the numerator; but
we simplify here for the purposes of exposition.
B. Since we are only concerned with long-run features we could equally well
assume that adjustment costs have mean zero, which is explicitly or implicitly
assumed in most q theories of investment; and that any variance and covariance
terms associated with adjustment costs have a minimal impact on mean q.
C. Here we respond to a number of points raised by past referees relating to the
issue of measurement of aggregate vs firm level capital. 1) Aggregate capital could
in principle be measured perfectly if aggregate investment figures and depreciation
factors were measured perfectly, which does not require firm level information. 2)
Typically there will be considerable time lags in data collection, and even if we
accept that statisticians get it right in the end they typically do so through a
process of regular revisions. Thus it is highly unlikely that Qt will be part of St,
the market information set. This in itself precludes any possible arbitrage based
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on Qt. But even if aggregate Qt were part of St, and thus investors knew that the
market was over- or under-valued in aggregate, their informational disadvantage
at the firm level would not allow them to exploit this information. 3) Some firm
level data on assets are of course available from balance sheets, but only at book
value; and in the era of Enron it seems reasonable to assume that this gives at
best an imperfect picture of firm-level replacement cost assets.
D. If q 6= 0, then, to the extent that the linearisation coefficents are sufficiently
different, there will be an additional term in d− p, the mean “cashflow” yield, so
the result will still hold as long as the cashflow yield is stationary for which there
is strong evidence. See Robertson, D and Wright, S (2004a), “Dividends, Total
Cashflows to Shareholders and Predictive Return Regressions (under revision for
Review of Economics and Statistics)
E. It is perhaps worth stressing that this does not require εt itself to be white
noise. So far all that we have established is the stationarity of q. Hence we
can write q = q + a(L)ωt where ωt is an innovation, hence, from (2.7) εt '
ε + (ρ − L)a(L)ωt. Similarly we can assume some process for it = b(L)ut where
ut may be some structural innovation like a technology shock. Efficient use of St
would imply E (ωtut) = 0, and hence cov(εt, it) = 0, but this makes no restriction
on the time series properties of εt.
F. Assuming an annual volatility of 20%: ie, we use the unconditional variance;
but the answer would barely differ if there were some predictability of rt+1. (The
approximate equality of η and vart (rt+1) implies βθr ' −1, which we would
expect)
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